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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006 1 (“TDRA” or the “Act”) represents a sensible and
progressive reform of American federal antidilution protection. In
bringing a degree of clarity to a doctrine that the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”) 2 did so much to
obfuscate, the Act, read properly, significantly limits both the
subject matter and scope of federal antidilution protection under
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. 3 Part I of the Article defines
three forms of trademark dilution and identifies which forms of
dilution the Act does and does not seek to prevent. Part II briefly
addresses the origins of the TDRA. Part III analyzes the Act’s new
standard for famousness and its reformulation of the law relating to
dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment. Part IV
concludes. 4
I. THE MEANINGS OF TRADEMARK “DILUTION”
“Dilution” is probably the single most muddled concept in all
of trademark doctrine. One reason why this may be the case is that
trademark commentators, myself among them, tend to speak of
several different species of trademark dilution without identifying
them any more specifically than by the generic name “dilution.” In
this Part, I distinguish three specific species of dilution: dilution of
† Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. Thanks to my Cardozo colleague Justin Hughes for extensive and detailed
comments on a previous draft.
1
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006).
2
Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127
(2000)).
3
15 U.S.C. 1125(c) (2000).
4
The Article does not directly address the “[e]xclusions” from protection set forth in
Section 2 of the Act or the free speech aspects of federal antidilution protection as others
in this symposium will do so. See Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision
Act—A Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1189
(2006).
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uniqueness, dilution by “blurring,” and dilution by “tarnishment.”
The Part emphasizes that the TDRA seeks to prevent only dilution
by blurring and dilution by tarnishment. The language of the Act
does not address and does not seek to prevent the dilution of a
mark’s uniqueness.
A. Dilution of Uniqueness
In a seminal 1927 article, 5 the trademark practitioner and
scholar Frank Schechter introduced to American law the concept
of trademark dilution. By “dilution,” Schechter meant to refer to
the impairment of a trademark’s uniqueness. 6 His primary concern
was to preserve what he variously termed a mark’s “arresting
uniqueness,” 7 its “singularity,” 8 “identity,” 9 and “individuality,” 10
its quality of being “unique and different from other marks.” 11 In
Schechter’s view, trademark uniqueness was worth protecting
because it generated “selling power.” 12 Certain very strong marks
were not simply a means of identifying and advertising source. In
a new age of mass production, they were also a means of endowing
the goods to which they were attached with the characteristic of
uniqueness, a characteristic for which consumers would pay a
premium. 13
5

Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927).
6
See William G. Barber, A “Rational” Approach for Analyzing Dilution Claims: The
Three Hallmarks of True Trademark Dilution, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 25, 43–44 (2005); Barton
Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 681–82 (2004).
For an important alternative reading of Schechter, which asserts that he sought to provide
antidilution protection only to marks which are “synonymous with a single product or
product class,” see Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88
IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003).
7
Schechter, supra note 5, at 830. See also Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?,
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16–17 (1999).
8
Schechter, supra note 5, at 831.
9
Id. at 827.
10
Id. at 822.
11
Id. at 831.
12
Id. at 830.
13
Consider the four principles that Schechter set forth in support of his “conclusion
that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark [is] the only rational basis for its
protection:”
(1) that the value of the modern trademark lies in its selling power; (2) that this
selling power depends for its psychological hold upon the public, not merely
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Schechter believed, quite rightly at the time, that antidilution
protection was necessary because anti-infringement protection,
based on consumer confusion as to source, would not fully
preserve the uniqueness of famous marks. 14 In situations where a
defendant used a famous mark on goods unrelated to those on
which the famous mark normally appeared (e.g., KODAK pianos,
ROLLS ROYCE chewing gum), consumers would not likely assume
that the defendant’s product had the plaintiff as its source. 15 Thus,
no cause of action for consumer confusion as to source would lie.
The beauty of Schechter’s original conception of antidilution
protection was that it was relatively easy to put into practice.
Uniqueness is an absolute concept. A mark is either unique or it is
not. If a senior mark is unique in the marketplace and a junior
mark appears that is identical to it, then the junior mark will
destroy the senior mark’s uniqueness. Thus, the test for dilution
was an essentially formal one. The judge need only consider the
identity or close similarity of the parties’ marks. If they were
identical or closely-similar, then the loss of uniqueness could be
presumed. 16 Where the consumer confusion test was a messy and
unpredictable empirical analysis centered on the consumer, the
trademark dilution test was a simple and relatively predictable

upon the merit of the goods upon which it is used, but equally upon its
uniqueness and singularity; (3) that such uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or
impaired by its use upon either related or non-related goods; and (4) that the
degree of its protection depends in turn upon the extent to which, through the
efforts or ingenuity of its owner, it is actually unique and different from other
marks.
Id. at 831.
14
Id. at 823–24.
15
Cf. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir.
1912) (holding that BORDEN as used on ice cream does not infringe BORDEN as used on
condensed milk).
16
Very much to their credit, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to have
appreciated this aspect of antidilution protection in their formulation of the factors that
courts in their respective circuits should consider in finding dilution. See Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2000) (considering similarity of
the parties’ marks and the “renown” of the senior mark in finding a likelihood of
dilution); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly mark similarity and, possibly, degree of
‘renown’ of the senior mark would appear to have trustworthy relevance under the
federal Act.”).

BEEBE_PAPER_091606_CLEAN

2006]

9/17/2006 5:57:40 PM

NEW ANTIDILUTION LAW

1147

analysis centered on the trademark. And like a true trademark
purist, Schechter believed that the cynosure of the law should be
the latter rather than the former. 17
As the Sixth Circuit recently recognized in Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel
Development, 18 Schechter’s original notion of antidilution
protection was quite “radical.” 19 The Ringling Brothers court
observed that its “practical effect if fully adopted would be to
create as the whole of trademark-protection law property rights in
gross in suitably ‘unique’ marks.” 20
Schechter’s original
21
conception has never been enacted into law, and the language of
the TDRA is careful to steer clear of it. Indeed, in the early stages
of the drafting of the Act, a form of antidilution protection based
on “uniqueness” was proposed and rejected. 22
B. Dilution by Blurring
If Schechter looked to antidilution protection to preserve what
the marketing literature now calls a brand’s “brand
17

As is not well-appreciated, Schechter deplored the operation of trademark
infringement analysis, in which the court must estimate whether a consumer of ordinary
sophistication would be confused as to the true source of the defendant’s goods. In his
still-authoritative history of trademark law, he argued:
Any theory of trade-mark protection which . . . does not focus the protective
function of the court upon the good-will of the owner of the trade-mark,
inevitably renders such owner dependent for protection, not so much upon the
normal agencies for the creation of good-will, such as the excellence of his
product and the appeal of his advertising, as upon the judicial estimate of the
state of the public mind. This psychological element is in any event at best an
uncertain factor, and “the so-called ordinary purchaser changes his mental
qualities with every judge.”
See FRANK SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 166 (1925).
18
170 F.3d 449.
19
Id. at 454.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12-13 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Hearing] (statement of Anne
Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association). See also id. at 22–23
(testimony of William G. Barber on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association).
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differentiation,” 23 modern trademark law—and the TDRA with
it—looks to antidilution protection to preserve what the marketing
literature now calls a brand’s “typicality.” 24 The law does so by
offering qualifying trademarks protection from “blurring.” The
idea underlying the concept of blurring is that the defendant’s use
of a mark similar or identical to the plaintiff’s mark will “blur” the
link between the plaintiff’s mark and the goods or services to
which the plaintiff’s mark is traditionally attached.
This
understanding of “blurring” is well-settled in trademark
commentary 25 and case law. 26 It forms the basis of the economic
defense of antidilution protection. As Judge Posner has explained,
A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by
providing a compact, memorable and unambiguous
identifier of a product or service. The economy is less
when, because the trademark has other associations, a
person seeing it must think for a moment before
recognizing it as the mark of the product or service. 27

23

See generally DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS (1996).
See, e.g., Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A
Behavioral Framework to Judge “Likelihood of Dilution”, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149,
152–53 (1993) (defining “typicality” as a brand’s “ability to conjure up a particular
product category”).
25
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can
Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006). Dogan and Lemley
write:
Blurring takes a formerly unique mark (say, Exxon), which consumers can
associate with the mark owner without any necessary context, and applies it to
unrelated products—say, Exxon pianos or Exxon carpets. Even if the
consumer understands that these different Exxons are unrelated, the
proliferation of Exxon-marked products may make it more difficult for
consumers to figure out which company is responsible for any particular
product. (Quick: What does Delta sell?)
See also David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of
the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117, 129
(2004) (“This blurring occurs because consumers no longer associate the famous mark
with only one line of goods or only one source of goods.”); Michael Pulos, A Semiotic
Solution to the Propertization Problem of Trademark, 53 UCLA L. REV. 833, 839 (2006).
26
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The
distinctiveness of the mark is diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior
user alone.”).
27
Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992). Cf.
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002). In Ty, Judge Posner writes:
24
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The beauty of the blurring theory of dilution is that it is
emphatically empirical in orientation. For the judge to find that a
junior mark “blurs” a senior mark, the judge must find that the
junior mark is causing consumers to “think for a moment” before
recognizing that the senior mark refers to the goods of the senior
mark’s owner. A merely formal analysis of the similarity of the
marks is insufficient. The judge must evaluate the effect of the
junior mark on the perceptions of actual consumers and must in the
process take into account such factors as the degree of
distinctiveness—or typicality—of the senior mark and the
sophistication of the relevant consumer population. The blurring
theory of dilution thus restores the consumer to her rightful place
as the cynosure of trademark law.
Understood in terms of typicality and consumer search costs,
the blurring theory of dilution is relatively straightforward.
Nevertheless, it continues to perplex the courts. This, I think, is
largely the fault of antidilution plaintiffs. Typically, antidilution
plaintiffs seek to persuade the court that the antidilution protection
provided to them by federal or state statute is the absolute, “in
gross,” and formal antidilution protection that Schechter originally
sought to implement. Invariably quoting Schechter, they seek to
argue that the statutes are designed to protect the “uniqueness” and
“selling power” of their marks. This, of course, could not be
farther from the truth. Anti-blurring protection is very different
and far more limited in scope. While two identical marks
coexisting in the same marketplace will by definition negate each
other’s uniqueness, they need not blur each other, i.e., they need
not increase consumer search costs or otherwise require consumers
to “think for a moment” before recognizing the respective sources

[T]here is concern that consumer search costs will rise if a trademark becomes
associated with a variety of unrelated products. Suppose an upscale restaurant
calls itself “Tiffany.” There is little danger that the consuming public will think
it’s dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this
restaurant. But when consumers next see the name “Tiffany” they may think
about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the
name as an identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to
think harder-incur as it were a higher imagination cost-to recognize the name as
the name of the store. So “blurring” is one form of dilution.
Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
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of the marks. This is especially the case when one of the marks is
very strong. No one can seriously suggest that the typicality of the
trademark FORD has been significantly diminished by the
coexistence in the American marketplace of a modeling agency—
or of millions of people, for that matter—with the same name.
Rather than engage in the hard work of showing blurring in the
marketplace, perhaps with survey evidence, perhaps with
testimony from actual consumers, plaintiffs tend to rest on the
formal similarity of the parties’ marks. Schechter would have
approved. But modern antidilution law, and the TDRA in
particular, calls for much more.
C. Dilution by Tarnishment
In his original formulation of his theory of trademark dilution,
Schechter had nothing to say about trademark “tarnishment.” This
should not be surprising. Trademark tarnishment has simply
nothing to do with trademark dilution as Schechter originally
conceived of it. 28 Nor does it have anything in common with the
theory of blurring. By tarnishment, we mean damage to the
associations or connotations of a trademark. 29 When a Las Vegas
casino called its players club the “New York $lot Exchange,” it
arguably tarnished to some degree the registered trademark NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE by implying that the latter is in some sense
a venue for gambling, if not also for stacked odds. 30 There is no
blurring here, however. Instead, the casino’s parody relied on and
may very well have reinforced the consumer’s mental connection
between the registered trademark and its source. Nevertheless,
28

See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseperable: Dilution and Infringement in
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 983 (2004) (“While tarnishment now comprises
one of the two flavors of dilution, Schechter said nothing about it. Furthermore,
tarnishment seems to be at odds with the entire concept of dilution.”). See also Beebe,
supra note 6, at 695–98.
29
See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting
that “‘[t]arnishment’ generally arises when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products
of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke
unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product[s]”).
30
See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir.
2002) (reversing grant of summary judgment on the grounds that a trier of fact could find
that the defendant’s use “would injure NYSE’s reputation” and thus violate New York
state anti-tarnishment law).
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rather than identifying tarnishment as a separate cause of action,
something which the Congress originally set out to do, 31 modern
antidilution doctrine—both in the FTDA 32 and the TDRA 33 —has
incorporated tarnishment as a form of trademark dilution.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE TDRA
The TDRA is the latest of several attempts by the Congress to
establish a viable regime of federal antidilution protection. All
previous attempts—including, it must be said, the FTDA—ended
in failure. 34 In the 1930s, Schechter himself urged the Congress to
adopt antidilution protection, and the Perkins Bill of 1932 included
antidilution provisions. 35 The Department of Justice opposed the
bill, 36 however, as it did most aspects of trademark protection at
the time, 37 and the bill failed. More recently, the Senate version of
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (“TLRA”) included
provisions designed to prevent trademark dilution, which it defined
as “the material reduction of the distinctive quality of a famous
mark through use of the mark by another person regardless of
[competition among the parties or likelihood of confusion].” 38 On
First Amendment concerns, these provisions were deleted from the
31

See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (2002).
32
The Supreme Court suggested in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
432 (2003), that the language of the FTDA may not address tarnishment. See infra note
51 and accompanying text. However, nearly all courts have assumed that the FTDA does
in fact provide for anti-tarnishment protection. See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:95 (4th ed. 2005)
33
See H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
34
See generally Welkowitz, supra note 31, at 153–62.
35
H.R. 11592, 72d Cong. (1932). As Welkowitz explains, supra note 31, at 154,
Schechter actually testified in support of a different bill, known then and now as the
“Vestal Bill,” H.R. 7118, 72nd Cong. (1931).
36
See 2 JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE § 5A.03
(2006).
37
See generally Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of TradeMarks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 183 (1949) (“Whenever there was a hearing
before any committee on the trade-mark bill, sooner or later there appeared zealous men
from the Department of Justice who raised all manner of objections.”).
38
S. 1883 § 36, 100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988), 134 CONG. REC. S5864-02 (daily ed.
May 13, 1988), S5868 (1988). See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, The 1996 Federal
Anti-Dilution Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 587 (1998).
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final version of the TLRA that emerged from the House-Senate
conference committee. 39 In 1995, the provisions deleted from the
TLRA were revived and modified to become the FTDA, which
defined dilution as, among other things, “the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence of absence of [competition
among the parties or likelihood of confusion].” 40 After a minimum
of deliberation, consisting of a one-day hearing before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property in
which the seven witnesses all supported the bill, 41 the FTDA
passed the House unanimously and the Senate on a voice vote to
become federal law. 42
An idiosyncratic draft hurriedly enacted into law, the FTDA
was wrong from the start. After the original Lanham Act was
enacted in 1946, a variety of courts hostile to trademark protection
probed the act for weaknesses, all in an effort, one judge wrote at
the time, to “cut this Act . . . down to size consistent with the
court’s conceptions of public policy.” 43 Many courts appear to
have approached the FTDA with very much the same spirit. The
Second Circuit, and the influential Judge Pierre N. Leval in
particular, took advantage of the ambiguous wording of the FTDA
to deny its protection to non-inherently distinctive marks. 44 Other
circuits read the FTDA to require the plaintiff to present evidence
of actual dilution, rather than of merely a likelihood of dilution. 45
Some judges and commentators questioned whether the language
of the FTDA itself, rather than its legislative history, addressed the
harm of trademark tarnishment. 46
More recently, in an
appropriationist art case, the Ninth Circuit read the
39

See 134 CONG. REC. H10411 (daily ed., Oct. 19, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. S16971
(daily ed., Oct. 20, 1988). See also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
431 (2003).
40
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
41
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032.
42
Id. at 1, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
43
S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 1949) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
44
See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Comm., Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2001).
45
See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999).
46
See, e.g., id. at 452 n.1.
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“[n]oncommercial use” language of Section 43(c)(4)(B) to mean
that if the defendant’s speech contained one drop of noncommerciality, “if it does more than propose a commercial
transaction,” 47 then the speech was immune to the prohibitions of
the FTDA. 48
Matters came to a head with the 2003 Supreme Court decision
in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue. 49 In a guarded opinion, the
Court declined to define dilution other than to quote from the
statutory definition. 50 The Court did, however, question whether
Section 43(c) created a cause of action for tarnishment. 51 It also
quoted in a footnote 52 from Judge Leval’s Nabisco v. PF Brands 53
opinion, perhaps signaling that it approved of the Second Circuit’s
restrictive interpretation of Section 43(c). Most importantly, the
Court read the language of Section 43(c) to require that the
plaintiff show evidence of actual dilution, rather than of a mere
likelihood of dilution, in order to be granted relief under the
section. 54 The Court acknowledged that requiring evidence of
actual dilution may entail “difficulties of proof,” but explained that
on the language of the statute, it could do no other. 55 To soften the
blow, the Court opined that “[i]t may well be . . . that direct
evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be
necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through
circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the junior

47

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
See generally Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between
Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive
Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005).
49
537 U.S. 413 (2003).
50
Id. at 433.
51
Id. at 432 (“Whether [tarnishment] is actually embraced by the statutory text,
however, is another matter. Indeed, the contrast between the state statutes, which
expressly refer to both ‘injury to business reputation’ and to ‘dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trade name or trademark,’ and the federal statute which refers only to the
latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA.”).
52
Id. at 427 n.5.
53
191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
54
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433–34.
55
Id. at 434 (“Whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an
acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory
violation.”).
48

BEEBE_PAPER_091606_CLEAN

1154

9/17/2006 5:57:40 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1143

and senior marks are identical.” 56 This passage has become
notorious in American trademark law. Some courts have read the
passage to mean that when the parties’ marks are identical, then
direct evidence of dilution is unnecessary because the identity of
the marks is itself sufficient circumstantial evidence of dilution. 57
Other courts have read the passage to mean that when the parties
marks are identical, then the only additional evidence that is
necessary to show dilution is circumstantial, rather than direct,
evidence (the so-called “identity-plus interpretation”). 58
In
56

Id.
See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL 22451731
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003), rev’d by Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d
Cir. 2004). Judge Scheindlin explained:
This sentence is not easy to interpret, as is apparent from the differing
interpretations of lower courts. Is the Court saying, as plaintiff maintains, that
when the junior and senior marks are identical, that in itself is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove actual dilution? See Nike Inc. v. Variety
Wholesalers, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (basing finding of
dilution on identity of the marks). Or, is the Court saying that circumstantial
evidence of actual dilution, as opposed to direct evidence, is sufficient when the
marks are identical? See Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431–32
(M.D.N.C. 2003) (holding that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s marks in its
domain names constituted circumstantial evidence sufficient to support finding
of dilution because defendant’s use hindered plaintiff from engaging in
electronic commerce under those domain names, hence “reduc[ing] the selling
power of plaintiff’s marks”).
Id. at *14. Cf. Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp.
2d 892, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (“In view of the developing status of the law on the nature
of evidence required, the court believes that the best course is to permit the plaintiff the
opportunity to present its dilution claim to the jury. The defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on this issue will be denied.”).
58
See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 452 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied
by Savin Eng’rs, P.C. v. Savin Corp., 126 S. Ct. 116 (2005) (“We interpret Moseley to
mean that where a plaintiff who owns a famous senior mark can show the commercial use
of an identical junior mark, such a showing constitutes circumstantial evidence of the
actual-dilution element of an FTDA claim.”); GMC v. Autovation Techs., 317 F. Supp.
2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (“GM’s evidence establishes actual dilution in that
Defendant has used marks that are identical to the world famous GM Trademarks.”);
Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003)
(“[T]he Court concludes that Variety has diluted the Nike trademarks due to the identical
or virtually identical character of the marks on the Accused Goods to the Nike
trademarks.”). Cf. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Pro-Line Protoform, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1085 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“[W]hen identical marks are used on similar goods, dilution—the
capacity of the famous mark to identify and distinguish the goods of the trademark
holder—obviously occurs.”); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. McEvoy, 300 F. Supp. 2d 352, 357 (D.
57
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resolving one split among the circuits, the Court created in this
passage the conditions for another. 59
With the effects of the Moseley opinion now being felt, the
time has shown itself to be ripe for reform of federal antidilution
protection. And if the primary lesson taken from the 1988 TLRA
experience and applied to the enactment of the 1995 FTDA was
that “‘twere well / It were done quickly,” 60 then the primary lesson
taken from 1995 and applied now is that it were well it were done
properly. The TDRA is the product of extensive work by the
International Trademark Association 61 and the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, 62 as well as by the Section
of Intellectual Property Law of the American Bar Association. 63
This work culminated in two hearings before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
(CIIP). 64 Representatives Lamar Smith and Howard L. Berman,
the Chair and the ranking member, respectively, of the CIIP, both
evinced close knowledge of the language of the Act in the
questions they asked of the witnesses. 65 The well-respected
Professor Mark Lemley of Stanford Law School represented the
academic community and gave level-headed testimony. 66 An
attorney from the American Civil Liberties Union spoke at both
hearings to the First Amendment issues implicated by antidilution

Md. 2004) (“Though dilution claims require evidence of actual confusion [sic], that
requirement is satisfied when, as here, the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark.”).
59
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rhenquist
Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 205–206 (2004).
60
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act. 1, sc. 7.
61
See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 6–21 (2005) (testimony and statement of Anne
Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association).
62
See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 21–29 (testimony and statement of William G.
Barber on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law Association).
63
See Committee Print to Amend the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13-33 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing] (testimony and
statement of Robert W. Sacoff, Chair, Section of Intellectual Property Law, American
Bar Association).
64
See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22; 2004 Hearing, supra note 63.
65
See, e.g., 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 47.
66
See id. at 18–21 (testimony and statement of Professor Mark A. Lemley, William H.
Neukom Professor Law, Stanford University).
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protection. 67 The civil society organizations Public Citizen and
Public Knowledge subsequently became closely involved in the
drafting process, particularly when the bill was being considered
by the Senate, and won crucial amendments to the language of the
Act. 68 Unlike the FTDA, the TDRA is mature legislation and
deserves to be read as such. 69
III. THE TDRA AND THE NEW DILUTION DOCTRINE
What, then, does the TDRA do? Among its most important
innovations are the following. First, and most importantly, the
TDRA provides that the plaintiff need merely show a likelihood of
dilution in order to gain relief under Section 43(c) 70 —thus
overriding the central holding of Moseley. Second, it explicitly
provides that non-inherently distinctive marks may qualify for
antidilution protection. 71 Third, it rejects the doctrine of “niche
fame” and raises the requirements that a mark must meet to qualify
as “famous” for purposes of the Section 43(c). 72 Fourth and
relatedly, it reconfigures the factors that courts should consider to
determine whether a mark is “famous.” 73 Fifth, it explicitly
provides that both “dilution by blurring” and “dilution by
tarnishment” are forms of dilution actionable under Section 43(c)
and formulates definitions of “dilution by blurring” and “dilution
by tarnishment.” 74 Sixth, it sets forth factors that courts should
consider to determine the likelihood of dilution by blurring. 75
67

See 2005 Hearing, supra note 22, at 30–39 (testimony and statement of Marvin J.
Johnson, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union); 2004 Hearing, supra
note 63, at 33–43 (testimony and statement of Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union).
68
See generally Public Knowledge, H.R. 683: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2005, http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/tmdilution (last visited August 4, 2006).
69
Nevertheless, to the extent that it prescribes “new policy,” it is probably properly
characterized, in Judge Leval’s terms, as a “delegating statute” rather than a
“micromanager statute.” See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 196–98 (2004).
70
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
71
Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
72
Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).
73
Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–1125(c)(2)(A)(iv)).
74
Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), (2)(B) & (2)(C)).
75
Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–1125(c)(2)(B)(vi)).
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Seventh and finally, it significantly expands the scope of the
Section 43(c)’s “[e]xclusions” relating to conduct, such as
“parody,” that is not actionable as dilution. 76
In this Part, I will comment on only a few of these reforms. In
doing so, I will argue that the Act is in fact a progressive step
towards a more restrictive—and sensible—application of federal
antidilution law. I begin with the Act’s new formulation of what
qualifies as “famous” for purposes of Section 43(c).
A. The New Standard for Famousness
1. The Statutory Language
The Act provides, in what will become the new Section
43(c)(2)(A), that “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation
of source . . . .” 77 This is an important new formulation that
provides guidance to the courts on how famous a mark must be to
qualify for antidilution protection, something that the FTDA failed
to do. 78 As was intended by the drafters of the Act, 79 the use of
the language “widely recognized” and “general consuming public
of the United States” repudiates outright the strange doctrine of
“niche fame.” 80 It also significantly raises the bar for what
qualifies as “famous.” On this language, it is likely that marks
such as INTERMATIC, 81 LEXINGTON, 82 or WAWA, 83 which were

76

Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)).
Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).
78
See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“The [FTDA] does not tell how famous a mark must be. Nor does it provide any direct
guidance as to how courts should answer the question.”).
79
See, e.g., 2005 Hearings, supra note 22, at 6 (testimony of Ann Gundelfinger,
President, International Trademark Association).
80
On niche fame, see J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted:
Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 731–33 (2004).
81
See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
82
See Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 32, at § 24:92.1 n. 14 (“The court
found the mark strong enough that confusion was likely and erroneously concluded that
therefore the mark was famous—a non sequitur.” (italics omitted)).
77
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found to be famous under the terms of the FTDA, would not be
found to be famous under the new terms of the TDRA. None of
these marks is “widely recognized” by the “general consuming
public” of the entire country. The TDRA’s new standard for
famousness returns federal antidilution protection to its core
principles. The antidilution right is an extraordinary right that only
extraordinary marks deserve. In essence, and as was arguably
originally intended by Schechter, the mark must be a “household
word” to qualify. 84
What the TDRA lacks in this regard, however, is something
that it could not have been expected to provide and that the federal
courts themselves must establish. In the tradition of Justice
Scalia’s “err on the side of caution” presumption in Wal-Mart
Stores v. Samara Brothers, 85 courts should, if in doubt, rule that a
given mark is not “famous.” 86 This is consistent with Congress’
goal in the TDRA to restrict the subject matter of antidilution
protection only to truly deserving marks.
The TDRA also establishes new factors for courts to consider
in determining whether a mark is famous. The FTDA set forth an

83
See Wawa Dairy Farms v. Haaf, No. 96-4313, 1996 WL 460083, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 7, 1996) (“There is simply no question that WAWA is a highly renowned, famous
mark”).
84
See TCPIP Holding Co.v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“The examples of eligible ‘famous marks’ given in the House Report—Dupont, Buick,
and Kodak, see H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030—are marks that for the major part of the century have been household words
throughout the United States. They are representative of the best known marks in
commerce.”).
85
529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (“To the extent there are close cases, we believe that courts
should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product design,
thereby requiring secondary meaning.”).
86
One initial rule of thumb may be that if the finder of fact is a long-time resident of
the United States and has not heard of the mark or is only vaguely familiar with it, then
the mark is probably not “famous” for purposes of antidilution protection. After all, the
plaintiff seeks exclusive rights in its mark across all product categories and should be
able to show that its fame is at least as extensive. If the plaintiff falls back to arguing that
its mark is “famous” in some area of commerce with which the finder of fact happens not
to be familiar (either because of his or her age, geographic location, consuming habits, or
lack of fashion sense), then this is a good sign that the plaintiff’s mark is not, in fact,
“famous” for purposes of antidilution protection. The TDRA is simply not intended to
protect trademarks whose fame is at all in doubt.
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unwieldy list of eight factors. 87 The TDRA shortens this list to
four: first, the extent of advertising of the mark; second, the extent
of sales of goods offered under the mark; third, the “extent of
actual recognition of the mark;” and fourth, whether the mark is
registered on the principal register. 88 This is a curious formulation
of factors. As an empirical matter, the first and second factors are
subsidiary to and are logically incorporated by the third factor—
the “extent of actual recognition of the mark.” 89 A court should
not grant antidilution protection to reward—i.e., to promote—
spending on advertising, just as it should not grant such protection
in recognition of something like the plaintiff’s good faith in trying
as hard as it can to make its mark famous. What we are concerned
with are the facts on the ground, the “actual” fame of the mark.
The first two factors in particular should only help us to determine
the outcome of this third and by far most important factor.
Otherwise, they are mere formal distractions from what should in
all events be a purely empirical—and, ideally, a survey-based—
analysis. The fourth factor, concerning the registration status of
the mark, is arguably irrelevant to the fame analysis. At best, it
could weigh against a finding of fame on the assumption that the
plaintiff did not consider the mark to be of sufficient value to
justify registration. But the mere fact that a mark is registered
cannot logically weigh in favor of a finding that it is famous.
2. Inherent Distinctiveness and Famousness
Notably absent from the TDRA’s new list of factors to be
considered in assessing the fame of the mark is any reference to the
degree, if any, of inherent distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark.

87

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–1125(c)(1)(H).
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–
1125(c)(2)(A)(iv)). The version of the Act reported to the House proposed only three
factors to determine the degree of recognition of the mark. See id. The fourth factor,
concerning the registration status of the mark, appears to have been added to the version
of the Act subsequently reported to the Senate. See S. 683., 109th Cong. §2.
89
Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(iii)). Cf. Barton Beebe, An
Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 95 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 45, on file with author) (noting that the assessment of
a mark’s “actual” marketplace strength logically incorporates the effects of its inherent
strength).
88
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Indeed, in addressing the issue of famousness, the Act avoids
altogether the term “distinctiveness” and instead refers to the
“degree of recognition” of the mark. 90 Elsewhere, the Act amends
Section 43(c)(1) to provide protection to the owner of a famous
mark “that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired
distinctiveness . . . .” 91 It may therefore appear that the Act
repudiates outright the controversial Second Circuit reading of the
FTDA that limits antidilution protection only to marks which are
inherently distinctive.
It is important to recognize, however, that this need not be the
case. The Act’s list of factors to be considered in assessing
famousness is non-exclusive: “the court may consider all relevant
factors, including the following . . .” 92 Thus, it is consistent with
the provisions of the Act for the Second Circuit to continue to
factor in a mark’s degree of inherent distinctiveness in assessing
the mark’s fame. In light of the language of the new Section
43(c)(1), the Second Circuit may not establish a per se rule that
only inherently distinctive marks will qualify as “famous” under
the TDRA, but it may continue to consider inherent
distinctiveness—indeed, to weight it strongly—in its analysis of
the mark’s “degree of recognition” as a “designation of source of
the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 93 As an empirical
matter, non-inherently distinctive marks such as UNITED or
AMERICAN may be widely recognized as designations of source,
but not necessarily as designations of source of the plaintiff’s
goods in particular.
Furthermore, as we will see below, the TDRA sets out factors
that courts should consider in determining whether the plaintiff’s
mark is likely to be blurred, and there, the mark’s “degree of
inherent or acquired distinctiveness” is explicitly incorporated as a
factor. 94 Arguably, though now in need of some tailoring, Second

90

H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).
Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
92
Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).
93
Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)). On why a court may want to weigh
the inherent distinctiveness of a plaintiff's mark against the plaintiff, see Levy, supra note
4, at 1207–08.
94
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
91

BEEBE_PAPER_091606_CLEAN

2006]

9/17/2006 5:57:40 PM

NEW ANTIDILUTION LAW

1161

Circuit inherent distinctiveness doctrine remains alive and well—
or at least, given sufficient judicial interest, could remain alive and
well—under the TDRA.
3. The Ironies of Anti-Blurring Protection for “Famous”
Marks
There are two ironies to anti-blurring protection for “famous”
marks. The first is well-recognized. It is that the very marks
which are so famous as to deserve anti-blurring protection already
receive the same scope of protection from source-confusion-based
anti-infringement protection. 95 Unlike those of Schechter’s time,
modern branding practices routinely leverage brands into new
product areas. This has conditioned consumers to expect that a
trademark will appear on products far afield from the products on
which the trademark normally appears. For example, where the
mark HARLEY-DAVIDSON originally appeared only on motorcycles
and closely-related paraphernalia, now it can be found on a wide
variety of more or less ridiculous products and services. 96 The
result is that if a famous brand name, particularly an inherently
distinctive one such as INTEL or NIKE were to appear on nearly any
product, regardless of its nature, it is likely that consumers would
assume that that product originates from the same company
responsible for all the other products bearing the brand name—or,
at least, that it is likely that an injunction would issue on that
basis. 97 Relatedly, as a matter of trademark doctrine, because the
95

See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 6, at 687; Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789,
846–47 (1997); Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 90
TRADEMARK REP. 823, 834–41 (2000).
96
This is as good an example as any of what Sara Stadler has termed self-dilution. See
generally Nelson, supra note 6. Cf. Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and
Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 1006 (1999) (discussing the
downscaling of brands and observing that “[u]ntil the trademark loses its cachet, these
activities will bring happiness—lots of designer utility—to people who might not
otherwise be able to afford it”).
97
My colleague Justin Hughes raises the examples of “DISNEY cigarettes” or “INTEL
garbage collecting services” as uses of famous marks on goods sufficiently unrelated to
the goods to which the marks are traditionally attached that consumer confusion as to
source would not likely occur. These are persuasive counterexamples on the issue of the
actual likelihood of consumer confusion in the marketplace. However, courts have
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scope of anti-infringement protection expands with the strength of
the mark, famous brands enjoy an extraordinarily broad scope of
protection, likely extending across all product categories. Thus,
for the marks which truly deserve it, anti-blurring protection is
mostly superfluous and is not uncommonly treated as such by
federal courts.
The second irony is not well-recognized and strikes to the heart
of anti-blurring doctrine. It is that the very marks which are so
famous as to deserve anti-blurring protection are essentially
immune to blurring on account of their overriding fame. We have
long lacked empirical knowledge of how trademark blurring works
and how it can be measured. The one good exception is work by
Jacob Jacoby, the leading survey expert in American trademark
law, along with Maureen Morrin. In 2000, Morrin and Jacoby
reported the results of a study they designed to assess the accuracy
and speed of subjects’ memory retrieval of brand information after
subjects were exposed to potentially brand-diluting stimuli. 98 In
other words, they sought to measure blurring. One of their findings
is quite striking: “It appears that very strong brands are immune to
dilution because their memory connections are so strong that it is
difficult for consumers to alter them or create new ones with the
same brand name.” 99
This finding touches upon a fundamental problem in trademark
doctrine, one which most students of trademark law quickly
recognize and are told just as quickly to forget in a sort of “move
along, nothing to see here” manner. The problem is that trademark
doctrine protects strong marks far more than it does weak marks; it
treats the strongest brands as also the most fragile brands.

shown a willingness to enjoin such uses in the name of preventing consumer confusion
when it is clear that the court is actually seeking to prevent tarnishment or
misappropriation. Consumer confusion as to source has proven to be a very flexible legal
concept. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding, in a case of clear parody, that “there is
a likelihood of confusion as to origin, approval, endorsement or other association of the
Garbage Pail Kids’ products and mark with the plaintiff[‘s Cabbage Patch Kids products
and mark]” (emphasis added)).
98
Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an
Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL. & MARKETING 265 (2000).
99
Id. at 274.
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Consider the situation in Moseley. There, the plaintiff argued that
its brand—VICTORIA’S SECRET—was so strong as to be famous,
perhaps even a household word. 100 But then the plaintiff argued
that the use of VICTOR’S SECRET by one Victor Moseley as the
name of his store in a strip-shopping center in Elizabethtown,
Kentucky, that crossroads of the world, would damage the
VICTORIA’S SECRET brand to such an extent that Moseley’s use
should be enjoined. 101 One wonders, if so trivial a use can damage
a brand name so much as to merit a federal court’s injunction, then
perhaps the brand name isn’t so strong after all.
For apologists of anti-blurring protection, this is an old and
tiresome argument, which they meet with two standard responses.
The first is to speak of a slippery slope, of “death by a thousand
cuts” or the “first of a hundred bee stings.” 102 But perhaps it is
time to challenge this facile response. As an initial matter, like the
FTDA before it, the TDRA does not establish a slippery slope
standard. It asks whether the defendant’s use is itself “likely to
cause dilution,” not whether the defendant’s use together with
some number of other similar uses sometime in the future would
be likely to cause dilution. 103 Moreover, the only good empirical
knowledge we have of how trademark dilution works suggests that
truly famous marks are much stronger than we thought, that there
may be no slippery slope, that the first “cut” or the thousandth may
never draw blood. Courts should not take the slippery slope for
granted. Rather, anti-blurring plaintiffs should be required to show
not only that others are likely to do as the defendant has done, but

100

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424–25 (2003).
Id. at 424.
102
For a fine discussion of these metaphors, see Petitioners’ Reply Brief on the Merits
at 7–9, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015).
103
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
Admittedly, the lack of statutory language in support of a slippery slope standard has not
prevented courts from reading such a standard into the fourth fair use factor in copyright
law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000); Sony Corp. of Am. v Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (stating that the plaintiff must prove “either that the particular
unauthorized use is harmful, or that if the use should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the . . . market for the copyrighted work”); A&M Records v. Napster,
239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
101
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also that these uses will indeed be likely to blur the plaintiff’s
brand name. As it stands, the slippery slope argument in antiblurring doctrine is a formalism that distracts from marketplace
reality, and the reality, if the empirical evidence can be credited, is
that blurring is far less common and far less of a threat than we
might have thought.
The second response of trademark apologists goes to the issue
of misappropriation or “free-riding.” The argument is that when a
court enjoins someone like Moseley from using a variation of a
famous brand, the court seeks to prevent not so much the blurring
as the misappropriation of the mystique or “selling power” of the
famous brand. 104 Thus, though Moseley’s use may itself cause
little or no harm to the VICTORIA’S SECRET brand name, still,
Moseley is reaping where he has not sown and should be prevented
from doing so. 105 While this may be a sound basis for judicial
intervention under some other area of law, the TDRA is, on its
plain language, not a misappropriation statute, nor for that matter
was the FTDA. Where, by comparison, the antidilution article of
the EC Trademark Directive explicitly prohibits conduct that
“takes unfair advantage of . . . the distinctive character or the
repute of the trade mark,” 106 the American Congress has now had
two chances to address misappropriation in Section 43(c) and has

104

See generally Franklyn, supra note 25, at 117 (“[W]hile American dilution law
purports to be about preventing dilutive harm, it really is about preventing free-riding on
famous marks.”). See also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Posner, J.) (discussing an anti-free riding rationale for antidilution protecition).
105
See generally Franklyn, supra note 25.
106
Council Directive 89/104, art. 5(2), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, 5 (EC). Article 5(2) reads in
full as follows:
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade
any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to
goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is
registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use
of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to,
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
Id. See generally Ilanah Simon, Dilutive Trade Mark Applications: Trading on
Reputations or Just Playing Games?, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 67 (2004).
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not done so. Rather, in language that was the result of a quite
deliberate drafting process, the Act establishes that only uses
which “impair[] the distinctiveness” or “harm the reputation” of
the famous mark will be enjoined. 107 Misappropriation per se is
not actionable under Section 43(c). 108
B. The New Blurring: Guilt by “Association”
1. The TDRA’s Four-Part Definition of “Dilution by
Blurring”
The TDRA defines two forms of dilution: “dilution by
blurring” and “dilution by tarnishment.” The Act defines dilution
by blurring as “association arising from the similarity between a
designation of source and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 109 The term “association” is,
of course, extraordinarily broad in meaning and may appear to give
little guidance to the courts. One dictionary defines it as “the
mental connection or bond existing between any sensations,
perceptions, ideas, or feelings that to a subject or observer have a
relational significance with one another.” 110 Fortunately, the
definition of dilution by blurring contains important limitations on
what kind of “association” is actionable. On the language of the
new Section 43(c)(2)(B), the plaintiff must show, first, that the

107

H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
Franklyn’s defense of what is arguably the strongest basis for antidilution protection
is compelling. See generally Franklyn, supra note 25. Nevertheless, the language of the
FTDA and TDRA does not contemplate a misappropriation cause of action.
109
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)).
110
WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986). The term “association” is
used elsewhere in the Lanham Act. Section 43(a)(1)(A) prohibits the use in commerce of
a mark which is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of [a] person with another person.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This notion of “association” is based on confusion as
to source: A consumer must associate the parties’ marks in a way that leads the consumer
to assume that the parties are somehow affiliated. In anti-blurring doctrine, by contrast, a
consumer associates the parties’ marks to the extent that she sees the marks as similar,
but is nevertheless aware that the parties themselves are otherwise entirely unrelated.
108
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defendant’s blurring speech is perceived by consumers as a
designation of source, i.e., as a “mark or trade name,” for the
defendant’s goods; second, that consumers make an association,
i.e., a “mental connection [of] relational significance,” between the
plaintiff’s mark and the defendant’s mark; third, that consumers do
so because of the similarity between the two marks; and fourth,
that this association “impairs the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s
mark. 111 I consider here in turn each of these aspects of the Act’s
definition of dilution by blurring.
First, in specifically requiring that the defendant’s blurring
speech take the form of a “mark or trade name,” the Act makes
clear that the anti-blurring provisions of Section 43(c) will not
prohibit speech that consumers perceive as non-source-distinctive,
such as advertising copy or a non-distinctive description of the
defendant’s goods. In essence, then, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant’s mark (or trade name) would qualify for protection
under the Lanham Act as a designation of source but for the fact
that it blurs the plaintiff’s mark. The anti-blurring plaintiff may
thus find itself in the awkward position of arguing in favor of the
“distinctiveness” of the defendant’s mark, however descriptive and
lacking in secondary meaning it may otherwise appear to be. For
example, if the plaintiff sells its computers under the trademark
APPLE, and the defendant establishes a website with the domain
name applecomputerrepairs.com or a store called Apple Computer
Repairs, then the anti-blurring plaintiff will be required to show
that consumers perceive the defendant’s speech as a “mark,” i.e.,
as distinctive of the defendant’s source, as having secondary
meaning, rather than as merely a description of what the defendant
does or a reference to the plaintiff’s source. Consider another
example. If the plaintiff sells its automobiles under the mark FORD
and the defendant manufactures automobile floor mats with the
mark FORD embossed on them (to match the interior of the car),
then the plaintiff will be required to show that consumers perceive

111

H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
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the embossment as distinctive of the defendant’s source rather than
the plaintiff’s. 112 To the extent that the plaintiff shows that
consumers perceive the embossment as distinctive of the plaintiff’s
source, then the plaintiff is showing consumer confusion under
Section 32 or Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, not blurring under
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. 113
Second, in requiring that the plaintiff show “association” in
addition to “similarity,” the Act requires that the plaintiff do more
than merely show that its mark is similar to or identical with the
defendant’s mark.
Otherwise, why bother including the
“association” requirement? In the aftermath of Moseley, some
courts have concluded that if the parties’ marks are identical, then
blurring may be presumed. 114 This presumption is inconsistent
with the language of the new Act, however, if not also with the
empirical work referenced above. 115 To conclude simply that two
marks are similar or identical is an essentially formal
determination; a judge may make this fairly arid finding without
reference to the marketplace. But to conclude further that
consumers associate the two marks, be they identical or merely
similar, requires an empirical analysis of the marketplace itself.
The plaintiff must establish that consumers are exposed or likely to
be exposed to both marks and, upon being exposed to them,
actually connect or are likely to connect the two marks in their
minds. Consider examples from the marketplace: UNITED for
airlines and for moving services, ACE for bandages and for
112

Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Lloyd Design Corp., 184 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(finding dilution where the defendant manufactured automobile floor mats bearing the
plaintiff’s trademarks).
113
Relatedly, the Act provides no antidilution cause of action for conduct in the nature
of keyword or pop-up advertising. Cf. 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400
(2d Cir. 2005); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 2005 WL 1903128
(E.D.Va. 2005); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 273 (E.D.Va.
2003). In these situations, the harm, if any, to the plaintiff does not arise from any
similarity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks. Rather, the defendant, be it
a search engine company, a pop-up advertising company, or a buyer of their services, is
using or instructing computers to use the plaintiff’s mark as a signifier of the plaintiff.
See generally Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark
Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 371 (2006); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in
Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005).
114
See supra note 58.
115
See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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hardware stores, LEXIS for information services and LEXUS for
automobiles, APPLE for computers and APPLE for banking services,
TIME for the magazine and TIME for the cafe on Broadway in
Manhattan, BALLY for fitness clubs and for high-end leather goods,
etc. It is not clear as an empirical matter that consumers actually
make a “mental connection” between these marks notwithstanding
the identity or close-similarity of the marks as a formal matter. 116
And certainly, in establishing the further requirement of
“association,” the Act itself appears to recognize that some
similarities or identities will not lead to “association.” In sum, the
TDRA requires plaintiffs to present evidence beyond the mere fact
of the “similarity” between the parties’ marks to show that this
“similarity” actually produces or is likely to produce “association”
in the minds of consumers.
Third, in requiring that the plaintiff show that “association”
arises from “the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark,” the Act recognizes that some associations will arise
from sources other than the similarity of the parties’ marks. Thus,
if consumers associate the two marks only because the products to
which they are affixed have similar characteristics, then no action
for blurring will lie. More difficult is the question of two marks
that are dissimilar as written but similar in connotation. An
example is HÄAGEN-DAZSYOPLAIT and FRUSEN GLÄDJÉLA YOGURT,
both for ice cream. 117 In such cases, it is likely that a court will
look to the remainder of the Act’s definition of dilution by blurring
to conclude that though a consumer’s association between the two
marks may stem from their similarity in connotation, this
association is nevertheless not actionable. The consumer’s
association between the marks may impair the distinctiveness of
both brand’s connotations, but it does not impair the
distinctiveness of the brand names themselves, at least not in a way
that antidilution protection, for all of its scope, is willing to
116

However, even if consumers do not in the first instance make a mental connection
between these marks, it may be worth recognizing that search engines such as Google
may make an association between such marks to which consumers may then be exposed.
The emergence of what might be termed “machine association” may give plaintiffs a
reasonable means of persuading a court that similarities between marks will, at least in
the internet context, give rise to an association between the marks.
117
Cf. Häagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Glädjé Ltd. 493 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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prevent. Think of what might otherwise result. As an example,
one German beer manufacturer could seek to prevent all other
German beer manufacturers from giving German-sounding names
to their beers. The exclusive right to a connotation would lead to
the exclusive right to an entire language or variations on it. 118 In
light of this problem, which goes not simply to languages but also
to fields of connotation, similarity analysis for purposes of antiblurring protection should tread lightly when it extends its analysis
beyond similarities of sight and sound to consider similarities of
meaning.
Fourth, and in the pattern of the reasoning above, the Act
makes clear that the plaintiff must present evidence beyond the
mere fact of “similarity” arising from “association” to show that
the defendant’s mark “impairs the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s
mark. After all, as above, if a showing of association arising from
similarity were enough, then there would be no need to include this
further requirement. Here, the term “distinctiveness” means
distinctiveness of source. It does not mean uniqueness or what I
have elsewhere called “differential distinctiveness,” i.e.,
distinctiveness from other marks. 119 On its plain language, the Act
establishes a cause of action for “blurring” in the minds of
consumers, not for the loss of uniqueness in the marketplace.
Thus, the plaintiff must show, as an empirical matter, that
consumers who are exposed to both the plaintiff’s and the
defendant’s marks are less competent to make a “mental
connection” between the plaintiff’s mark and the plaintiff’s source,
and plaintiffs must do so in the face of empirical evidence that
suggests that, for very strong marks, this loss of consumer
competence is unlikely. 120 Mere formal reasoning along the lines
of “if similarity, then association, and if association, then
118

See id. at 75 (“This suit is grounded in plaintiff’s failure to appreciate the difference
between an attempt to trade off the good will of another and the legitimate imitation of an
admittedly effective marketing technique. . . . [W]hen consumers became increasingly
aware of the ingredients in food products, producers rushed to extoll the virtues of their
‘all natural’ products. It would be ludicrous, however, to suggest that in our free
enterprise system, one producer and not another is permitted to take advantage of the ‘all
natural’ marketing approach to enhance consumer reception of its product.”)
119
See Beebe, supra note 6.
120
See Morrin & Jacoby, supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
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impairment of distinctiveness” will not suffice. This was Judge
Phillips’ essential insight in his Ringling Bros. opinion 121 and the
Supreme Court could not have been clearer in Moseley in its
statement of this fundamental point: “‘Blurring’ is not a necessary
consequence of mental association.” 122 In explicitly calling for a
showing of impairment of distinctiveness, the TDRA has, very
much to its credit, only reinforced this basic premise.
2. The Blurring Factors
How then might a court determine whether the defendant’s
mark does or will “impair the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s
mark? The Act sets forth a non-exclusive list of six factors that
courts may consider in making this determination:
(i) The degree of similarity between the designation of
source and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is
engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the designation of source intended
to create an association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the designation of
source and the famous mark. 123
Two of these factors are particularly interesting, and they
highlight the difference between the subject matter of anti-blurring
protection and the scope of anti-blurring protection. While the Act
elsewhere explicitly provides that non-inherently distinctive marks
come within the subject matter of anti-blurring (and anti-

121

See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Development, 170 F.3d 449, 458–61 (4th Cir. 1999).
122
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
123
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–
1125(c)(2)(B)(vi)).

BEEBE_PAPER_091606_CLEAN

2006]

9/17/2006 5:57:40 PM

NEW ANTIDILUTION LAW

1171

tarnishment) protection, the second factor allows that the scope of
this protection for non-inherently distinctive marks may be quite
thin. The third factor does the same and more. A mark such as
APPLE for computers is “arbitrary” and thus inherently distinctive.
Nevertheless, it is used by several other firms, most notably the
record production company and the bank that go by the same
name. This may function to narrow the scope of anti-blurring
protection for such marks even though they are inherently
distinctive. This is a progressive development and makes sense
from the point of view of competition. Firms do not likely need to
use the entirely fanciful marks (e.g., NOVARTIS, ACCENTURE) of
other firms, but they may need or want to use the marks of other
firms that are arbitrary (e.g., ACE, TIME) or suggestive (e.g.,
124
CATERPILLAR) with respect to those other firms’ products.
As for the other factors, they are very much in the mainstream
of anti-blurring doctrine. On the first factor, the court must limit
its assessment of similarity to the parties marks themselves and
may not consider the similarity of the parties advertising or nonsource-distinctive trade dress. This is required both by the
language of the first factor and the Act’s definition of blurring. 125
With respect to the fifth factor, the court should consider the
defendant’s intent on the assumption—made familiar by
consumer-confusion analysis 126 —that if the defendant intended to
create an association with the plaintiff’s mark, we may assume that
the defendant was successful in doing so. Again, however, the
mere creation of an “association” does not necessarily lead to the
impairment of distinctiveness. This maxim applies as well to the
sixth factor, which calls for survey or anecdotal evidence of
“association.” The plaintiff must present evidence of a sufficient
degree of association, just as it must show a sufficient degree of
similarity and recognition, to show that the defendant’s mark does
124

It is interesting in this regard that in the conclusion of his 1927 article, Schechter
spoke of providing antidilution protection only to “coined” marks, Schechter, supra note
5, at 830, whereas earlier in the article he spoke of providing such protection to
“arbitrary, coined, or fanciful” marks, id. at 828.
125
H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)).
126
See, e.g., Cable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506,
520 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“one who intends to confuse is more likely to succeed in doing
so”).
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or is likely to impair the source distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s
mark.
C. “Tarnishment” and Dilution
The Act defines dilution by tarnishment as “association arising
from the similarity between a designation of source and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 127 This
definition of tarnishment may be parsed in the same way that the
Act’s definition of blurring was parsed above. The plaintiff must
show, first, that the defendant is tarnishing the plaintiff’s mark by
means of something that consumers perceive as a designation of
source of the defendant’s goods; second, that consumers perceive
an “association” between the parties’ marks; third, that this
association arises from the “similarity” of the parties’ marks; and
fourth, that this association harms or is likely to harm the
reputation of the famous mark.
The first aspect of the Act’s definition of tarnishment may very
well play a crucial role in limiting the reach of anti-tarnishment
protection under the Act. Consider a t-shirt or bumper sticker that
states “Wal-Mart is Evil.” This conduct, though certainly
tarnishing, is not prohibited under the Act. The reason is that in
neither of these cases will consumers perceive these signs as
designations of the source of the defendants’ goods. Similarly, a
motion picture about the exploitation of service industry workers
that prominently features the Wal-Mart mark would also not be
enjoinable under the Act. The motion picture is not using the mark
as a designation of the source of the motion picture—though, of
course, the motion picture is using the plaintiff’s mark as a
designation of source of the plaintiff’s goods. 128 For this reason,
127

H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C)).
Cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
Consider other canonical cases in anti-tarnishment law. Neither “Michelob Oily” nor
“Enjoy Cocaine” nor the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders uniform would be seen as
designations of source of the defendant’s goods and thus would not be enjoinable under
the anti-tarnishment provisions of the TDRA, though courts might conceive of some
category of “conjectural goods” as the basis for an injunction. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
128
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analysis of appropriationist art is also greatly simplified. 129 As
above with respect to blurring, the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that the defendant’s speech would qualify for protection
under the Lanham Act as a designation of source for the
defendant’s goods but for the fact that it tarnishes the plaintiff’s
trademark. 130
The third aspect of the Act’s definition of tarnishment provides
another important and related limitation on the reach of the Act’s
anti-tarnishment protection. The plaintiff can only claim antidilution protection against harmful associations that arise from the
“similarity” of the parties’ marks. Thus, the tarnishing alteration
of the plaintiff’s mark 131 or the placing of the mark in a tarnishing
129

Cf. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003).
There, the defendant would have been able quite easily to show that he is not using the
BARBIE trademark or doll as a designation of source of his own goods.
130
Consider, finally, a website under the domain name walmart.net that engages in
extensive negative commentary about the retail chain. The proprietor of the website may
be liable for initial interest confusion, but in no event would it be liable for tarnishment
unless the court is willing to find that consumers perceive the walmart.net domain name
as a designation of source of the defendant’s goods or services. To the extent that the
court finds that consumers perceive the domain name as a designation of source of the
plaintiff’s goods or services, then the court must limit its analysis to a consumer
confusion cause of action, not a tarnishment cause of action. For similar reasons, the use
of the WAL-MART trademark throughout the website would also not be grounds for an
anti-tarnishment cause of action under the TDRA unless the court is willing to find that
consumers perceive these uses as referring to the defendant’s goods or services rather
than the plaintiff’s.
The basis of antidilution doctrine as set forth it the TDRA is that consumers perceive two
separate entities using two similar or identical designations of source; the junior mark
may then either blur or tarnish the senior mark. But if consumers believe that the junior
entity is using the senior entity’s mark simply to refer to the senior entity rather than as a
designation of source for the junior entity, then the senior entity has no basis for an antitarnishment cause of action. There are no longer two designations of source. Rather,
there is the senior entity’s designation of source and the junior’s nominative use of that
designation.
131
Cf. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). In Deere, the defendant
aired a television commercial that showed a stylized depiction of the plaintiff’s mark
being chased around the screen by a stylized depiction of the defendant’s mark and a
barking dog. The Second Circuit held, under New York law, that:
Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the sole purpose of promoting a
competing product, are properly found to be within New York’s concept of
dilution because they risk the possibility that consumers will come to attribute
unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with
inferior goods and services.
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context 132 are not actionable under the TDRA. In neither case do
the tarnishing associations arise from the similarity of the parties
marks. To the extent that such conduct is actionable under state
antidilution doctrine, state law may very well be preempted as
being in conflict with the intentions of the TDRA. 133
IV. CONCLUSION
Schechter’s original theory of trademark dilution and
antidilution protection was indeed “radical.” Fortunately, the
TDRA does not implement anything like his original theory.
Indeed, much confusion could be avoided in the case law and
commentary by steering clear of the muddled term “dilution”
altogether. What the Act provides is two very specific forms of
trademark protection: anti-blurring protection and anti-tarnishment
protection. Plaintiffs will nevertheless urge courts to interpret the
Act as an implementation of Schechter’s original theory and to find
in the term “dilution” a receptacle for all imaginable harms to their
marks. Courts must resist this compulsion and they have no better
basis for doing so than the specific language of the Act itself.

Id. at 45. The TDRA would not provide the plaintiff in Deere with an anti-tarnishment
cause of action because the defendant merely altered the plaintiff’s mark. In any event,
there was no similarity in Deere between the plaintiff’s mark, altered or otherwise, and
the defendant’s mark.
132
Cf. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding tarnishment where pornographic motion picture “Debbie Does
Dallas” made extensive use of elements of the uniform of the Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, No. 76-3612, 1976 WL
20994 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 1976) (finding that title of pornographic motion picture “Tarz
& Jane & Boy & Cheeta” “dilutes the value of the registered trademark Tarzan”).
133
Cf. K. Keith Facer, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: A Whittling Away
of State Dilution Statutes, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 863, 908–25 (2000). The Act is
careful to speak only of “dilution by blurring” and “dilution by tarnishment,” never of
“dilution” tout seul. The regulation of other forms of dilution may be understood to have
been left to the states.

